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Political Control of Administrative Action : 
Accountability or Window Dressing ? 
Kenneth KERNAGHAN * 
A longstanding but increasingly important challenge to democra-
tic governments is the reconciliation of administrative power and 
administrative responsibility. Thus, political scientists share the 
concern of law teachers about the means by which administrative 
action may be directed and constrained. 
The major thesis of my paper is that social scientists have 
construed too narrowly the issue of political control over administra-
tive action in that they have tended 1) to focus on the value of 
accountability to the neglect of other values and 2) to focus on the 
role of political executives and legislators to the neglect of other actors 
on the political stage. In my paper, I will deal first with some problems 
of definition related to the topic under discussion and will then assess 
the nature of political controls and influences over administrative 
action, with particular reference to regulatory agencies. 
Definitions** 
First, the word control is variously interpreted but usually refers 
to a form of power in which authority of a legal or hierarchical nature 
is exercised. There is, however, another form of power, namely 
influence, by which one person affects the behaviour of another 
through such means as persuasion, suggestion and pressure. Thus, 
power may usefully be viewed as the sum of control and influence. And 
a reconciliation of administrative power and administrative responsi-
bility is achieved through the exercise of control and influence over 
administrative action. 
* Director, School of Administrative Studies and Professor of Political Science. Brock 
University. 
** For elaboration on the definitions used in this section, see my article entitled "Responsible 
Public Bureaucracy: A Rationale and a Framework for Analysis , (.1973) 16 Canadian 
Public Administraiion, pp. 572-603. 
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Secondly, it is important to emphasize political influence as well 
as political control over administrative action. Political control 
connotes the use of cabinet, ministerial and legislative authority. 
However, both ministers and legislators can exercise power over 
administrative action without resorting to authority enshrined in 
constitutional or statutory form — that is, they can exercise influence 
as well as control. It is more important still to recognize that in 
addition to ministers and legislators, a number of other actors (e.g. the 
news media, pressure group representatives, individual citizens) play a 
significant role in the political process. These participants exercise 
influence rather than control over administrative action. It is clear 
therefore that a wide range of actors in the political process, both 
within and outside government, exercise power over administrative 
action in the form of control and influence. 
Thirdly, I understand administrative action to refer to the 
administrator's role in both policy development and policy execution 
— that is, in the exercise of administrative discretion both in 
recommending alternative courses of action and in taking decisions 
under delegated legislative authority. 
Finally, the term accountability connotes a formal reporting 
relationship that does not take into consideration the role of partici-
pants in the political process who exercise power only in the form of 
influence and who have no authority to demand an accounting. 
Moreover, one of the major reasons why political control often 
amounts to window dressing rather than accountability is that 
accountability is frequently not the primary value pursued by central 
actors in the political process. Such values as equity, efficiency and 
responsiveness often compete with accountability for acceptance in the 
government market place. All these values are traditionally associated 
with and may be subsumed under the concept of administrative 
responsibility. This broad concept is analytically more useful than 
accountability in providing a complete and comprehensible explana-
tion of the forces affecting administrative action. Use of the concept of 
administrative responsibility permits recognition of the power exerci-
sed over government employees by a wide variety of participants in the 
political process, and of the significance of values other than 
accountability. 
These distinctions between control and influence and between 
accountability and responsibility are central to subsequent discussion 
which will focus on the means by which the many participants in the 
political process may control and influence administrative action, 
whether in regular government departments or in agencies, boards and 
commissions. 
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Political Control and Influence 
Much has already been written by political scientists about the 
means by which administrative activities in regular government 
departments may be directed and constrained. Comparatively little 
attention has been paid to the many non-departmental, semi-
autonomous bodies which vary greatly in their organizational form 
and in their relationships with government. Two important and 
distinguishable groups of agencies among these diverse entities are 
crown corporations and regulatory commissions. I propose to delimit 
the scope of my remarks by making only brief reference to depart-
ments and by focussing on government agencies in general and on 
regulatory commissions in particular. 
Despite the emphasis in this paper on government agencies, it 
would be useful to identify and evaluate the means by which 
government departments are controlled and influenced as a basis for 
assessing the extent to which such means are or could be applied to 
agencies. 
Since Mr. Trudeau came to power in 1968, he has made a 
determined effort to shape and utilize policy-making structures to 
strengthen the decision-making capacity of Cabinet ministers and so 
to reduce reliance on the policy advice of public servants. To this end, 
the Cabinet committee system has been revised ; the Prime Minister's 
Office and the Privy Council Office have been strengthened as 
coordinating and advisory mechanisms; and alternate sources of 
policy advice have been tapped through the increased use of such 
devices as task forces, advisory boards and white papers. There has 
therefore, been a diffusion of advice and influence on policy develop-
ment. At the same time as this apparent decline in the advisory powers 
of public servants has occurred, the expansion in the scope and 
complexity of government operations has tended to increase the 
discretionary powers of departmental public servants in the implemen-
tation of government policies and programs. 
The effort to enhance the control of political executives over the 
bureaucracy has not been matched by a corresponding increase in the 
capacity of the legislature to influence administrative action through 
surveillance and scrutiny of government policies and their implemen-
tation. Members of Parliament influence public servants indirectly 
through questions and debates but potentially the most effective 
means by which legislators may influence administrative action is 
through direct contact and confrontation with public servants in 
parliamentary committees. Despite the reform of the committee 
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system during the last decade, legislators still lack the expertise and 
research resources to question public servants effectively. Recent 
research by Robert Presthus indicates that public servants do not feel 
significantly influenced by Parliament as compared to government 
(the Cabinet and ministers), interest groups and their perception of the 
public interest. 
The accountability of public servants to Parliament is theoreti-
cally ensured by the doctrine of ministerial responsibility according to 
which a minister is responsible to Parliament for the acts of his 
administrative subordinates. It is generally acknowledged of course 
that a minister cannot in practice be reasonably expected to have 
knowledge of and to bear personal responsibility for all the activities 
of his departmental subordinates. 
It is not surprising therefore that ministers are reluctant to be 
held responsible for the administrative activities of such non-
departmental bodies as crown corporations and regulatory agencies. 
Indeed, many of these were established with semi-autonomous status 
in part to free them from political (e.g. executive and legislative) 
control and influence and to free ministers from answering to 
Parliament for the operations of these bodies. All these entities report 
annually to Parliament through a designated minister. The conventio-
nal theory and the usual practice, however, is that the designated 
minister answers to Parliament for the overall policy under which an 
agency operates but refuses to answer for the day-to-day operations of 
the agency for which the agency itself is responsible. 
The act constituting an agency provides for its structure and for 
the general policy objectives it is expected to pursue. This constituent 
act and other statutes bearing on an agency's responsibilities set out 
the various means by which a minister or the cabinet may control the 
agency. Among the primary means of control are a directive power 
which a minister or the cabinet may use to direct an agency to follow a 
specific course of action ; the power of a minister or the cabinet to 
approve an agency's regulations and by-laws; controls over the 
operating and/or capital budgets of certain agencies ; and powers of 
appointment and dismissal of agency heads and members. 
Although these powers appear to give ministers the potential for 
effective control over agencies, some ministers make little use of these 
control mechanisms. For example, some ministers may be reluctant to 
utilize their directive power because they thereby become responsible 
for the agency's action — to their possible political disadvantage. 
Other ministers prefer to influence an agency's activities through 
informal consultation and the exchange of information. This is an 
attractive approach for a minister who wishes formal accountability to 
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remain with the agency. Still other ministers feel that they simply do 
not have adequate instruments of control over government agencies. 
The separation which ministers maintain between responsibility 
for general policy as opposed to day-to-day management of an agency 
often frustrates the efforts of legislators to achieve greater public 
accountability of government agencies. This frustration is experienced 
both on the floor of the House of Commons and in parliamentary 
committees and is increased by agency heads who insist on their 
independence from political "interference" with their agency's opera-
tions. For example, the President of the CBC recently informed the 
Commons broadcasting committee that he would listen to complaints 
about CBC programs and policies but would not stand for "political 
direction" over the CBC. He said that he had confidence in his own 
ability "to distinguish between the proper expression of MPs' 
concerns about the CBC and any attempt to bring to bear political 
influence or direction upon our programming". 
Although the Trudeau government has enhanced the capability of 
political executives and, to a lesser extent, legislators to control and 
influence administrative action in departments, little has been done to 
facilitate more effective control over agencies. 
The Regulatory Process 
On the basis of these observations on control and influence over 
administrative action in departments and agencies in general, I want 
now to centre attention on regulatory agencies. The reasons for this 
focus are that political scientists in Canada have done little research 
and writing on regulatory agencies and these agencies pose perhaps 
the most formidable challenge to effective political control and 
influence. Crown corporations are a large and important group of 
agencies but it appears that the present relationship of crown 
corporations to government will be significantly altered by legislation 
in the very near future. 
Concern with regulatory agencies is justified also by the fact that 
the regulatory process is in very large part a political process. 
Regulatory agencies are involved in politics in the sense of the 
authoritative allocation of society's resources. The agencies contribute 
significantly to the development and implementation of public policy 
through their discretionary powers to make decisions in particular 
cases and to interpret the very general policy guidelines contained in 
their constituent acts. Some agencies contribute directly to policy 
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formation by providing advice to the government in the policy field for 
which they have regulatory responsibilities. 
An assessment of the means available to check administrative 
action in regulatory agencies demonstrates the independence these 
agencies enjoy as compared to government departments. Since the 
agencies are much less constrained than departments by the Prime 
Minister's Office, the Privy Council Office and the Treasury Board, 
the direct control of regulatory behaviour by political executives and 
legislators is very important. Yet we have already seen that the 
Cabinet, Cabinet Ministers and Members of Parliament exercise less 
control — and influence — over regulatory agencies than over 
departments. Among the means that have been suggested to promote 
greater accountability of these agencies to the government and 
Parliament are more extensive use of the ministerial directive power ; 
the provision of more specific policy guidelines in the constituent act 
and the regular updating of these guidelines to accord with changing 
government policy ; more frequent informal consultation between 
agencies and the minister to promote coordination of agency opera-
tions with government policy ; and improving the capacity of parlia-
mentary committees to oversee and scrutinize agency operations. 
The difficulty of achieving accountability through political con-
trol by ministers and legislators makes the role of other participants in 
the regulatory process comparatively more important. Such partici-
pants as representatives of regulated industries, of interest groups and 
of the news media cannot control regulatory behaviour by exercising 
legal or hierarchical authority over agencies. They can, however, 
influence agency decisions through various forms of pressure and 
publicity. Although they may exercise this influence to attain greater 
accountability of regulatory agencies, they may also seek responsible 
regulatory behaviour through the pursuit of such values as equity, 
efficiency and responsiveness. These values often clash with one 
another and with accountability as bases for agency decisions. 
Agencies are subject to the expectations of a variety of participants in 
the regulatory process and are obliged to reconcile the competing 
values pursued by these participants (e.g. accountability v. responsive-
ness or efficiency v. equity). 
Responsible regulatory behaviour increasingly requires that 
agencies respond not only to the expectations of the regulated 
industries but also to those of the many organizations, groups and 
individuals affected less directly by regulatory decisions. These 
participants in the regulatory process compete with the regulated 
industries for the ear — and the sympathy — of agency members. The 
regulated industries strive to influence the decision-making behaviour 
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of regulatory agencies both through formal channels and through 
informal, personal contacts. Industry representatives also interact 
with the various other players in the regulatory arena with a view to 
winning support for or minimizing opposition to their objectives. 
In terms of the major values mentioned earlier, the regulated 
industries tend to be primarily concerned with responsiveness and 
equity, but in a specific and narrow sense of these words. The 
regulatory agencies are perceived as responsive if they are attuned to 
the needs and requests of the regulated. And equity is interpreted as 
fair and just treatment of the regulated by the regulators. 
Recently, the activities of regulatory bodies have become a 
matter of more widespread public concern and the values of responsi-
veness and equity are now more broadly interpreted by both politi-
cians and the general public. Responsiveness involves sensitivity to the 
range of interests affected both directly and indirectly by agency 
regulation of industry. And equity connotes fair and just treatment 
among these interests. The pursuit of these values is accompanied by 
more active concern with the accountability of the regulatory agencies 
to political and judicial authorities. These values are actively articula-
ted and pursued by environmental, consumer and public-interest 
groups. Regulatory agencies are being encouraged to view the public 
interest less in terms of the efficient regulation of an industry and more 
in terms of the broad social and economic impact of their decisions on 
the general public. Similarly, the regulated industries have been forced 
into a more defensive posture in their relations with regulators and 
into efforts to demonstrate that their objectives are in accordance with 
the public interest. 
Thus, political executives and legislators who pursue accountabi-
lity through political control over administrative action must take 
more account of the influence of other political actors and of other 
values in the regulatory sphere. Aside from industry representatives, 
these actors tend to favour greater control by political executives and 
legislators because elected representatives are more likely than agency 
members to see the general welfare and are therefore less likely to be 
captured by the regulated industries. 
In view of the impact on the decisions of regulatory agencies of 
those with whom they interact, access to regulators on both a formal 
and informal basis is of central importance to all participants in the 
regulatory process. Thus, the expansion of formal interventions in 
regulatory proceedings and increased lobbying by consumer and 
public interest groups is a very significant new element in the 
regulatory sphere. It seems probably also that effective participation 
in the regulatory process of a wider range of interests will require freer 
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access not only to agency members and their staff but also to the 
information on which their decisions are based. 
I anticipate that life will become more difficult and more 
complicated for the regulatory agencies. They are likely to be 
subjected to closer political control, especially by ministers, and to 
increased political influence by other participants in the regulatory 
process. The administrative action of regulatory agencies will there-
fore be characterized by greater accountability to elected representati-
ves, responsiveness to a broader range of interests in society, and more 
equitable treatment of these interests. The present level of efficiency in 
regulatory agencies may, however, be adversely affected by the need to 
base their decisions not only on economic criteria but on political and 
social considerations as well. 
